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PROHIBITIVE POLICY: IMPLEMENTING THE FEDERAL ENDANGERED 
SPECIES Acr. By Steven Yajfee. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
1982. Pp. xii, 239. $17.50. 
Public policy is shaped by the interaction between governmental institu-
tions and private interest groups, constrained by the substantive demands of 
the particular policy at issue. In Prohibitive Policy, Steven Yaffee analyzes 
the Endangered Species Act (ESA), as a case study of how these forces 
affect the interpretation of an absolute prohibitive mandate. He describes 
the technical and political tensions inherent in a prohibitive statute and ex-
plains why policy results often differ from articulated statutory goals. 
Y affee notes that even the most explicit statutory language may not ensure 
effective control over policy development. Yaffee instead encourages 
draftsmen to recognize that policy outcomes are determined by the relative 
power of each of the actors affected by a statute. He believes a statute will 
succeed only when it tips the balance of power in favor of the intended 
objective. 
A prohibitive statute outlaws certain action completely. Thus, beyond a 
set standard, benefits may not be balanced against the cost of compliance. 
On its face, such a statute leaves little room for bargaining among con-
cerned parties. As a result of this absolutism, it is often difficult to enact a 
prohibitive statute in controversial areas. Y affee believes Congress adopted 
the prohibitive language of the ESA only because no one perceived any cost 
to doing so (p. 57). The preservation of species had strong symbolic and 
political value. Experts defined extinction as a technical problem that 
would not affect any domestic interests. The ESA thus escaped emascula-
tion and became a mandate to preserve society's environmental heritage (p. 
57). 
Yaffee cautions · that prohibitive policy works no more rapidly than 
other kinds of policy and that implementing prohibitive policy is not much 
different from implementing other types of policy. The ESA advocates' high 
hopes for vastly improved protection of species and their critical habitats 
rested on the dual assumptions that the federal agencies empowered to im-
plement the ESA had little discretion and that the ESA itself had provided 
clear and certain scientific criteria for implementation (p. 58). A lack of 
resources and technological uncertainty, however, prevented the agencies1 
from confidently deciding to list an endangered species or habitat, which 
made swift and effective implementation impossible. 
Scientific professionals in the agencies set priorities among species and 
habitats to enable them to set standards and begin carrying out their statu-
tory mission. According to Yaffee, subjective value judgments made by 
agency decisionmakers were the primary factor in ordering priorities. 
Thus, staff ideologies and personal goals unexpectedly played a major role 
1. The critical decisions to list species or habitats are made by the Fish and Wildlife Serv-
ice's Office of Endangered Species in the Department of Interior and by the Office of Marine 
Mammals and Endangered Species of the National Marine Fisheries Service in the Depart-
ment of Commerce. 
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in what were originally to be nondiscretionary scientific decisions. Once the 
objective criteria were discarded, issues of environmental protection be-
came open to negotiation within the agencies (p. 85). 
Yaffee next describes the political influences that affected the negotia-
tion of scientific decisions. He asserts that politics play an important role in 
the implementation of the ESA - interagency consultations under Section 
7 of the ESA may result in the continuation of projects despite their impact 
on endangered species or critical habitats, delay of certain listings and 
habitat designations, low priorities assigned to other species or habitats, and 
private interests influencing the degree of protection ultimately provided (p. 
86). Yaffee thus demonstrates that the implementation of the ESA in par-
ticular and prohibitive policy in general will balance competing public in-
terests despite the absolute language of a prohibitive statute.2 Nonetheless, 
he insists that the statutory language of the ESA should remain unchanged 
despite its apparent ineffectiveness. If the ESA were not prohibitive, 
threatened species would rarely prevail in court against a powerful private 
interest. A three-inch fish could never compete with a virtually completed 
$90 million dam,3 nor could a Furbish lousewort survive a battle with a 
$600 million federal project.4 The negotiation that occurs within the pro-
hibitive framework of the ESA becomes the vehicle for balancing dollar 
costs with the need to protect endangered species. 
The prohibitive policy of the ESA has proved successful in practice be-
cause it forces all federal agencies to consider the environmental mandate 
seriously. A more flexible statute would have seriously undermined the bu-
reaucracy's ability to carry out the ESA's goals. Settlement and reconcilia-
tion of environmental disputes is only possible where the parties are willing 
to negotiate. The ESA forces all interested parties to a bargaining table and 
encourages compromises which, according to Yaffee, have often resolved 
disputes. The negotiation process reconciles the competing political, social, 
and economic interests implicated by species preservation conflicts. With-
out the incentives to negotiate provided by a prohibitive statute, Yaffee 
doubts whether the goal of species preservation could have been achieved. 
Obstacles to implementation remain, however. Federal agencies' biases 
in favor of tradition and against accountability combine with the capture of 
upper level policymaking by the regulated development interests, to slow 
the environmental protection process. If immediate agency action cannot 
be spurred by a mandate as clear as the ESA, Yaffee wonders whether any 
statute can overcome the phenomena of inertia and capture (pp. 117-31). 
Yaffee contends that the impetus for vigorous implementation and enforce-
ment of a prohibitive policy must, therefore, come from outside the bureau-
cracy to counteract these institutional barriers. His advice is borne out in 
2. Even supporters of the ESA have noted that some account of the social costs of species 
preservation is already considered in implementing the ESA. See, e.g., Sagoff, On the Preser-
vation of Species, 1 CowM. J. ENVTL. L. 33 (1980). Yaffee argues that this desired balancing 
of interests necessarily occurs in the action agencies, especially at higher, more politically sen-
sitive levels of the bureaucracy. P. 86-87. 
3. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
4. A compromise which saved the species emerged from what could have been an irrecon-
cilable conflict between preserving the lousewort and building the Dickey-Lincoln Dam. P. 
102. 
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practice, as a strong constituency of support organizations, backed by the 
ESA provision allowing citizen suits, have pressured an otherwise unre-
sponsive bureaucracy to respond to the national will expressed in the ESA. 
Ultimately, hope for the vindication of general interests, such as those all 
citizens share in the environment, may depend more upon such sources of 
countervailing private power than upon formal legal rules, however broad 
their scope or noble their intent. 
Prohibitive Policy is instructive in revealing how a prohibitive statute 
can regulate agency behavior in areas where traditional forms of regulation 
cannot. The book's greatest contribution is its admonition to lawyers and 
legislators to develop more realistic appraisals of the potentials of legisla-
tion. Although Yaffee concentrates on the implementation of the ESA, his 
message - that the language oflegislation cannot, by itself, contain private 
power unless the legislature also enlists its own constituencies in defense of 
the statutory purpose - applies to the effectiveness of prohibitive statutes 
in almost any substantive area. Legislators would do well to ponder that 
advice. 
